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Abstract  
An overwhelming majority of experts has been flagging for decades that “Saving the Planet” 
requires immediate, persistent and drastic action to curb a variety of catastrophic risks over 
the 21st century. However, despite compelling evidence and a range of suggested solutions, 
transnational coordination of effective measures to protect our biosphere continues to fall 
short. To remedy, we propose a novel platform for addressing the central issue of affording 
trust, transparency and truth while minimising administrative overheads. This will empower 
an even loosely organised, global grass-roots community to coordinate a large-scale project 
on a shared goal (“Commons”) spanning the digital and real world. 
The Web3 concept is based on the swiftly emerging “Blockchain” and related cryptographic, 
distributed and permissionless technologies. “Wisdom of the crowds” mechanisms involving 
competitive parallelisation and prediction markets are enabled by formalised reputation and 
staking to incentivise high-quality work, fair validation and best management practice. 
While these mechanisms have been (mostly separately) applied to science, business, 
governance, web, sensor, information and communication technologies (ICT), our integrative 
approach around Blockchain-enabled ‘operating principles and protocols’ sets the basis for 
designing novel forms of potentially crowdfunded Decentralised Autonomous Organisations 
(DAOs). 
Introduction 
There is a markedly growing awareness and willingness in the general public to take action 
on complex global challenges. Climate change, biodiversity and environmental protection for 
the striking objective “Saving the Planet” represent the prime, real-world example elaborated 
in this paper. For many years, various communities have impressively succeeded in putting 
these vital topics on the political agenda [1-8]; yet, it turns out that governments are, 
somewhat inevitably, hesitant to implement effective measures that are urgently called for by 
knowledge leaders as their adverse short-term impact on economies and familiar life styles 
of their electorate would presumably deny them a next term in office [9]. 
By virtue of promoting their careers, most senior politicians are well versed in handling 
issues through legislation, negotiations, rhetoric or simply sitting them out, which applies well 
to securing their power and sway public opinions; but such conduct is evidently unfit for 
  
dealing (directly) with nature. In addition, mainstream news chiefly focusses on post-disaster 
reporting, thus letting preventive or preparative measures fade out of public attention, in 
particular if their outcome cannot be cast into catchy footage. Consequently, there is a 
glaring need to provide a tool to implement grass-roots led actions of global impact for the 
good of everybody. 
“Saving the planet” may be deemed a prime, if not the ultimate example of a “Commons”, 
which may be defined as a social practice of governing a resource, not by state or market, 
but by a community of individuals that self-governs the resource through institutions that it 
creates [10]. In the absence of a central organisation guided by a commercial interest, this 
Commons faces a list of serious challenges including decision making on significant funding 
between highly diverse interest groups, allocation of (financial and in-kind) resources, e.g., 
manpower and materials, management and governance. In parallel, such an organisation 
will have to vigilantly guard against operational inefficiency, corruption, monopolisation, 
nepotism and other unfair exploitation, which would be detrimental for the capability to raise 
crowdfunding and community engagement, and to deliver on its objectives. 
This paper proposes a novel approach to efficiently stage global grass-roots initiatives 
towards “Saving the Planet” based on “Blockchain”. This the Web3 [11] technology has 
gathered significant momentum since its first practical implementation “Bitcoin” in 2009 [12]. 
Through a strategic combination of cryptography and sourcing globally distributed computing 
resources from the crowd, this Distributed Ledger Technology1 (DLT) uniquely bestows an 
unprecedented level of trust between potentially anonymous players without the need for a 
middleman. Hence, blockchain-enabled ‘operating principles and protocols’ can serve to 
pool stakeholders across physical and virtual environments, and provides the foundation for 
concerting actions on globally shared goals [13]. 
Bitcoin [12] has already become a (still quite volatile) store of value. Underlying blockchain 
concepts also bear further perspectives for monetary systems, accounting and supply chains 
[14, 15]. The introduction of the “Ethereum” blockchain [16] and a cohort of its derivatives 
after Bitcoin has significantly extended the application space of DLTs. Ethereum’s 
conceptually “Turing-complete” virtual machine [17] can execute “smart contracts”, which 
can be described as “programmable money” by encoding conditionals for transactions of 
cryptocurrencies on a time-stamped, unforgeable ledger. Of particular interest has been the 
recent emergence of decentralised Finance (“DeFi”) and the introduction of relatively stable, 
fiat-currency pegged tokens [18-20]. 
By now, a remarkable variety of (decentralised) applications (“DApps”) [21] has been crafted 
on top of these smart contracts. While some of them pursue a direct commercial focus, 
blockchain could also be implemented to increase the sustainability of businesses, e.g., for 
promoting ‘greenness’ and enabling traceability, fair trade and supply chain transparency 
[14, 22, 23]. Other initiatives are currently being assessed to deliver ‘socially responsible’ 
Commons, e.g., in enabling digital audit and disclosure capabilities, informing platform 
governance protocols and new measures of fairness in food security contexts [24]. Yet, the 
overwhelming majority of these designated, typically Ethereum based applications are still 
geared for the advancement of blockchain and its immediate cryptoeconomic ecosystem, 
e.g., for governance [25, 26], prediction markets [27], bounty networks [28], crowdsourcing 
[29], crowdfunding [30], data handling [31-33], privacy [34] and gaming [35]. 
 
1 While the terms Blockchain and DLT are used interchangeably in this paper, strictly speaking, DLT also 
includes ledger technologies (such as Hashgraph) that do not technically use "blocks". 
  
In focusing on the practicalities of such implementations versus conventional solutions 
offered by existing processes [36], it seems to be just a matter of time before blockchain 
solutions will widely materialise in the virtual worlds of financial transactions, accounting, 
supply chains, data and information. In 2016, the first Decentralised Autonomous 
Organisation (“TheDAO” or Đ) [37] was launched; while the original DAO was short-lived for 
reasons [38] also discussed later, we still want to resort to strong elements of its underlying 
idea.  
This paper elaborates a best-practice, blockchain-based approach for establishing “trust” 
and finding “truth” as the backbone of a global Commons, which operates and delivers in the 
material world. Such a novel type of DAO needs to be soundly firewalled against 
unintentional error and manipulation, whether by abuse of assets or misdirection of 
objectives. Within smart contracts, so-called “oracles” [39] enact automatic decision making 
based on inputs; a major vulnerability lies in forged or biased information furnished by 
humans on the “state of the world”, including records, and physical sensors. To this end, we 
suggest how “truth” and intimately related “trust” can be provided at the interface of 
blockchain with the real world by the mechanisms of “competitive parallelisation” of work and 
“wisdom of the crowds” (also referred to as “collective intelligence”) enabled prediction 
markets. 
Commons 
Structure 
The basic elements involved in delivering on a project addressing a shared goal, with the 
prominent case of “Saving the Planet”, are displayed in Figure 1. There is a set of historic 
records and a wide range of “sensors”, i.e., devices that spatio-temporarily characterise the 
physico-chemical quantity, that feed models with real-world data that are processed into 
information. Their interpretation guides the selection of projects, which may operate in the 
political domain, e.g., protests and lobbying, fundraising, projects to physically address a 
problem, e.g., cleaning up land and oceans, or Research and Technology Development 
(RTD) for creating novel solutions, e.g., negative emission technologies (NETs) to remove 
greenhouse gases from the atmosphere or to improve simulation models, for advising 
subsequent decision making.  
 
Figure 1 Organisational structure of “Commons” with blockchain-enabled trust finding mechanisms. In order to 
gear a best-practice for “Saving the planet”, first data about the “state of the world” is collected from sensors and 
records in order to feed models. These models provide information, which can be interpreted by (expert) groups 
or artificial intelligence (AI), e.g., to identify “quick win” (physical) actions that are likely to make a direct, highly 
beneficial impact on the environment at good value for money, measures to influence policies or research and 
  
technology development (RTD). These projects are then executed, managed, monitored and governed, and the 
circle reinitiates with the next round of measurement, analysis, selection, delivery and assessment of projects. 
These measures need to source “workers” for execution, monitoring and management of 
tasks, and for performing governance. While Commons tend to activate an extraordinary 
level of volunteers and in-kind support, especially physical actions, RTD and publicity involve 
significant expenses, e.g., for professional services, infrastructure and materials. Even more 
than in a pure financial investment, and similar to charities, it is critical for the positive spirit 
and engagement of the participating community that resources are spent as wisely, fairly, 
efficiently and transparently as possible, while only grudgingly accepting somewhat 
inevitable friction losses. 
Commercial Objectives versus Commons 
Whether in the real world or on the virtual blockchain, there are projects that cannot be 
(entirely) carried out by volunteers and donations. In the case where there is a commercial 
promise for a project, funding may be raised by private equity or shares in a company 
through an initial public offering (IPO). A similar, yet legally not fully elaborated tool [40, 41], 
called initial coin offering (ICO, with a “coin” mostly referring to a so-called “ERC20” token on 
the Ethereum blockchain) has been implemented for numerous blockchain-based projects. 
Such ICOs may be deemed an intermediate of crowdfunding and an IPO. While pros and 
cons of such token economies have been discussed [42], a Commons, such as “Saving the 
Planet”, distinguishes from commercially directed endeavours by a fiscally unfavourable 
“return-on-investment”, even upon a successful “completion”. A global Commons would 
actually contribute to the good of mankind, rather than focussing on generating (individual) 
wealth or oligopolies, and also those who have not provided funding (or even opposed it) will 
benefit in the end. 
Still, governments and charities already allocate significant, but by far insufficient funding to 
such planet-saving initiatives, including subsidies, tax relief and support for charities or non-
government organisations (NGOs), if compliance with a certain set of rules and proper 
governance can credibly be demonstrated. As compelling unique selling point (USP) for a 
blockchain-based implementation, the DAO offers fully transparent accounting and 
transactions based on a tamper-free distributed ledger requiring only minimum 
administrative overhead and eliminating middlemen. Furthermore, through “certification” of 
efficient spending, good procedural practices, high transparency and regulatory / legal 
compliance, such a novel DAO may attract major crowdfunding from individuals, 
organisations and governments.  
Challenges for Implementing Real-World Commons 
It is critical that all participants of such projects are appropriately incentivised to deliver their 
contributions at the highest level of quality, efficiency and honesty. This is a notable 
challenge in Commons as its contributors are not listed on the payroll of a traditional 
centralised organisation where a solid commitment may be linked to attractive contracts, 
longer-term career perspectives and social pressure of co-located colleagues. Instead, the 
global distribution of players may be characterised by a certain level of anonymity and lack 
of daily oversight, which bears a significant risk of defocussing and malevolent exploitation. 
Simply speaking, all contributions from real-world sources, especially when involving 
humans, whether work, data or expertise, might be flawed, either to unfairly collect rewards, 
e.g., for poor-quality or entirely fabricated contributions, to introduce a bias to undermine 
overall project objectives, or simply by inadvertent error. A solid method of validation is, 
therefore, key to project success. 
  
Truth Finding through ”Wisdom of the Crowds” 
This section reviews where “wisdom of the crowds” mechanisms already underpin important 
mechanisms in the real world before interweaving them through the blockchain-based tools 
as outlined in the subsequent section. 
Business 
The persistent success of market economies over the last millennia. When embedded in a 
somewhat regulated, level-play landscape, it well proven that monetary rewards issued in a 
competitive process are best suited to attract, direct and steer efforts; they typically induce 
efficient (even though not perfect) self-organisation and validation. Governments impose a 
set of rules to minimise adverse effects of raw capitalism such as formation monopolies, 
exploitation of work force and the toll on the environment. Market economies further rely on 
the concept of “wisdom of the crowds” based prediction markets, as, for example, 
epitomised by stock exchanges, financial futures, opinion polls and betting agencies. In 
these markets, a diverse community of stakeholders, preferentially those with expertise and 
some “skin in the game”, e.g., through their assets or reputation, advise decision making by 
taking a collective punt at future (eventually economic) prospects such as return on 
investment.  
Web2.0  
Access to “wisdom of the crowds” has been implemented very successfully in the form of 
Web2.0 platforms, for instance through social media (e.g., “likes”, “followers”), online 
shopping and travel (e.g., “rating”, “comments”). Perceived quality and conciseness of 
information can generate, for example, positive customer recommendations and reviews, 
social influence, and high rating levels in terms of engagement with an app [43, 44]. Even 
though these systems appear to be easy to manipulate, most portals have found ways to 
monitor and thus minimise forgery, whether driven by businesses or consumers. The 
information obtained from such forums has to be taken with a grain of salt, but can be very 
useful, especially in the paucity of other sources. For instance, a Web 2.0 platform to monitor 
disease outbreaks was able to indicate the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic at a very early 
stage [45-47]. There is also a trend towards “citizen science”, e.g., for involving the public in 
a puzzle-like protein folding challenge [48]. 
Science & RTD 
The need for decision making in the absence of “absolute truth” particularly holds for the 
realm of explorative science and technology. Researchers typically start by pitching an idea 
or hypothesis that often roots in an assumption of an (at least partial) understanding of an 
underlying functional context, e.g., supported through a simplified model or initial data. By 
embedding this hypothesis into an attractive objective, e.g., to solve a technological problem 
addressing a market need, to cure a disease or to advance knowledge, researchers request 
funding for a project. 
In most cases a panel of experts, who are not involved in the project, is consulted to 
objectively assess the opportunity, the proposed implementation plan and the requested 
resources. Upon their positive evaluation, the team carries out the project, and publishes or 
commercially exploits its results. The latter steps are normally preceded by a second tier of 
validation, e.g., through another panel of vetted peers or investors. Note that all steps within 
this sequence of project conception, planning, evaluation, implementation and dissemination 
are, in principle, prone to subjectivism, misjudgement and even fraud, whether from the 
originators or the assessors. 
  
Science addresses the system-innate imperfection in truth finding by its decades-old peer-
review system [49] and the requirement of transparent documentation in order to allow 
independent, multi-source validation. Even if fabricated work slips through, competitors are 
recognised for confirming and expanding important results, thus installing a second stage for 
effectively disguising fraud. So while manipulation is rarely sanctioned in the legal domain, 
abuse compromises reputation in the scientific community, which then, indirectly, affects 
future access to reward mechanisms such as funding, high-calibre journals and career 
promotions. 
In the academic world, reputation is often quantified by metrics such as the amount of 
funding raised, the number of publications, their citations and the weighting according to the 
so-called “Hirsch” or h-index [50]. Similar procedures are employed by various “trusted” 
organisations for ranking universities and their departments [51, 52]. While their downsides 
have been well exposed, these metrics are still widely used as a coarse measure for the 
impact of researchers and institutions within their scientific / academic community. So while 
it certainly exhibits occasional flaws or friction losses, this reputation-based peer-review 
system may be deemed “best practice”, as confirmed by its persistence over many decades, 
if not centuries. 
Also numerous platforms for fostering scientific collaboration have been successfully 
promoted. These, for instance, may share information, e.g., on genomic data, clinical 
research, elementary particles or astronomy; they may also provide open standards and 
protocols to enable competitive parallelisation of technical and scientific work and their 
validation. In applied RTD, the potential for global crowdsourcing will be further stimulated by 
globally ubiquitous resources for making “things”, by 3D printing and Fab Labs [53] as well 
as global cloud services for computing and artificial intelligence. For example, there have 
been several initiatives to establish open standards and development platform in specific 
research communities [54-60]. 
There have also been initiatives to create canonical standards for public or volunteered data 
in order to facilitate more open research. For example, the decentralised data exchange 
protocols OCEAN [31]; EDNA [61] allows individuals to bypass DNA aggregators such as 
23andMe [62] to anonymously share DNA samples and be directly compensated by 
researchers. 
ICT 
In the scenario illustrated in Figure 1, in addition to the “human factor”, also hardware and 
software for acquiring and transmitting signals and data might be compromised. Evidently 
methods such as printing on packages or labels is not very secure. Alongside the fast 
expansion of the internet, various tamper-proof and privacy preserving cybersecurity 
technologies such as end-to-end encryption (E2EE) and decentralised mix networks have 
been created, protecting communication against eavesdropping and manipulation while 
retaining the privacy of all involved parties [63, 64]. One of the main issues is whether the 
hard- and software installed are genuine, and, even if they are, they may contain secret 
backdoors [65-68]. Electronic signatures implemented by cryptographic public-key schemes 
have proven to be effective. To authenticate ICT hardware, systems like Trusted Platform 
Modules (TPMs) [69, 70] have been introduced on endpoint devices that store cryptographic 
keys specific to the host system. 
Software still provides a considerable vulnerability that has frequently been exploited, 
especially via downloading from insecure, fake online sources and email attachments. 
Various schemes have been implemented for verifying data integrity and authenticity; yet, 
online security experts would still discourage handling highly sensitive data such as 
  
passwords on computers that might have been tampered with, primarily through 
unauthorised online activities. 
Sensors 
The easiest entry gate for infringing data integrity in Figure 1 are physico-chemical sensors. 
As a very simple example, a temperature measurement might be rigged quite effortlessly by 
exhaling or holding a lighter near the sensor. Even normal environmental impacts, which are 
somewhat unavoidable during longer-term exposure to outdoor conditions, may “naturally” 
impair signal quality, e.g., by corrosion, biofouling, physical damage, power failure, flora or 
fauna. 
Apart from regular maintenance checks, acceptable trust in data acquired by such physico-
chemical sensors might be best instituted by pursuing a generalised form of “wisdom of the 
crowds” or vires in numeris (Latin: the strength in the numbers, a popular phase in 
cryptography) strategies. Instead of trusting a single unit or measurement, parallel, 
independently owned and operated sensor networks based on a repertoire of different 
functional / transduction principles should compete for monetary rewards and formalised 
reputation. Linked to provision of quality data displaying high spatio-temporal density, such 
“Big Data” may be efficiently validated, e.g., by artificial-intelligence (AI) supported 
consistency algorithms. 
The issue of genuineness of sensor hardware is already addressed by various stakeholders. 
Other than for computer hardware, each class of sensor system tends to require individual 
anti-counterfeit technologies [71, 72]; their choice is determined by acceptable costs and the 
appeal to fraudsters. Sensor data can be made trustworthy through a combination of 
techniques to create accountability for its accuracy. Critically, it is important for sensors to 
adhere to a Proof of Location protocol. These protocols use radio signals, IP addresses, and 
artificial intelligence to ensure Location cannot be misrepresented. 
Second, devices may use localised Proof of Stake networks to manage penalties and 
rewards for counterfeit or defective sensors. Sensors, as economic principals, must stake 
tokens (value) on the accuracy of their readings and their nearby peers may burn their 
tokens if they vote that the sensor is not providing accurate readings. Finally, audit has 
proven effective at managing accountability in general [73]. Other principles may nominate 
sensors for audit, and independent technicians, also compensated by tokens, can be 
prompted to perform checks and maintenance procedures for sensors. 
Blockchain Platform 
Toolbox 
In the virtual world, blockchain has already succeeded to master projects within corporate 
structures for commercial objectives [74-76]. Especially Commons, so far primarily 
advancing DLTs and related applications, have been developed by rather loosely organised 
global communities of often purposely anonymous and autonomous players. Management 
and governance are frequently founded on certain democratic decision making mechanisms 
and jurisdiction [77]. Interestingly, the paramount issue of authenticity, e.g., for financial 
transactions on the blockchain, has been quite convincingly implemented through the above 
mentioned, cryptographically secured public-private key and file distribution schemes. 
One of the most valuable tools available to blockchain communities is seigniorage, i.e., the 
difference between the value of new money and the cost required to create it. Modern 
governments use central banks to create new money, granting them the authority to decide 
how seigniorage is captured. Blockchain technology allows this to be decided in new and 
  
innovative ways, usually based on votes or other forms of transparent governance. It also 
enables precise microtransactions to underlie the seigniorage. For example, voters may 
ballot on policy to reward certain sensors, sensor-types, or geographic locations differently 
based on the collective needs of the Commons. The ultimate consequence of collectively-
decided use of seigniorage incentivises free market behaviours for the benefit of the DAO’s 
Common values. 
Establishing trust at the heart of blockchains themselves relies on crowd-based mechanisms 
involving “skin in the game” schemes referred to as proof-of-work and proof-of-stake, 
respectively. In the meantime, the blockchain community has created an ample ecosystem 
encompassing formalised reputation and staking schemes [78], idea markets [79], bounty 
networks [28], token bonding curves [80, 81] and curation markets [82]. Stablecoins are 
available to tackle the volatility of crypto- against fiat currencies [83-85] and a huge 
community advances technologies to widen the blockchain-innate bottlenecks regarding 
scalability, transaction throughput [86-90] and interconnectivity [91, 92]. There are several 
blockchain portals to support scientific publishing [93, 94], and RTD [95, 96].  
New interactive “Social Web” platforms that include cryptoeconomic incentivisation, objective 
vetting of experts via immutable reputation, track records and community-based validation of 
technological concepts will emerge. Data on the state of the world, e.g., obtained from 
simulation, historical records and “Internet of Things (IoT)” sensor networks [91, 97], can 
form the keystones of next-generation DAOs [98, 99] to (self-)organise conception, 
fundraising, selection, management, monitoring and governance [77, 98] of borderless 
grass-roots projects. Such organisation will efficiently funnel public engagement to 
successfully address the complex challenges of sustaining our global biosphere. 
Overall, the blockchains providing smart contracts and manifold options for tokenisation [42], 
such as Ethereum [16], appear to be a natural choice as a blockchain platform. 
Challenges 
Scamming, exploitations, and poor governance constitute major setbacks for any project. 
Blockchain has already suffered, e.g., through the notorious hack of “TheDAO”, the biggest 
crowdfunded project at its time having raised over $150 million from its more than 10,000 
supporters [37, 38] in 2016. This attack concerned a clever exploitation of TheDAO’s 
blockchain-encoded smart contract. In the meantime, there have been substantial 
improvements in smart contract security and other mitigation techniques, and even much 
larger projects raising several billion dollars have been launched [100, 101]. 
High-tech RTD projects are often classified according to the vagueness associated with 
value creation outcomes (conventional versus novel) and associated risk (low versus high) 
[102, 103]. Experimentation, in the face of uncertainty and risk, has been extensively studied 
in individual projects [104]. As a “Guinea pig” or genesis project, TheDAO undeniably 
exposed a major deficiency of DLTs; blockchain still struggles to find suitable test beds that 
can source a sufficiently large and diverse user base, including friendly and malicious actors, 
in particular when significant monetary incentives may irreversibly be siphoned off. Given the 
potential diversity of actors and their contributions here, platforms and associated 
governance protocols play key roles in ensuring equitable distribution of value, and in 
mitigating ‘appropriability’ concerns for specific use cases (e.g., safeguarding from 
opportunism) [103, 105].  
Hence, Blockchain might learn some important lessons from well-proven procedures of risk 
management in the introduction of potentially hazardous products like medical devices and 
drugs, such as (pre-)clinical trials and triaging, which promise great benefit for mankind, but 
  
may entail fatal consequences. Similarly, the “code is law” paradigm propagated by certain 
blockchain communities might clash with legislation, and may undermine contingency plans 
usually required to mitigate the fall-out of unintended effects, for instance in relation to 
program bugs and abuse. 
Newer blockchain technologies and networks, such as Telos [106], implement easily 
upgradable smart contracts and elected arbitrators to address the “code is law” challenges 
[107, 108]. The blockchain operators (miners or block producers) are expected to execute 
the orders of arbitrators, and if they reject to, they may be voted out by the token holders 
governing the network. Much like branches of government, these parties hold each other 
accountable with ultimate authority given to voting by token holders. 
In addition to proper testing, their crowd-based fabric already suggests that blockchain 
concepts may only bear fruits once a certain economy-of-scale kicks in, including a critical 
mass of (initially) blockchain-agnostic regular users. In other words, platform-enabled 
leverage can trigger ‘flywheel-type’ effects with increasing membership. However, the 
strength of such ‘network effects’ can vary dramatically, with consequences for the nature of 
value creation and capture [109]. 
Many of blockchain’s USPs are simply not easy to get across to the general public as they 
often require substantial understanding and rethinking; this demand runs against the vast 
majority of potential users who are often completely unaware which concrete problems 
blockchain actually solves, and what would be the tangible advantage to make it worth the 
“hassle”. Undoubtedly, and arguably the largest hurdle to widespread success, there is still 
tremendous work required to sophisticate, validate and converge its constituent technologies 
in the real and virtual world, and find ways to clearly articulate this to the (arguably widely 
apathetic) general public.  
Also lack of barrier-free access and rather poor user convenience presently pose major 
impediments to the ‘’scale out” of DLTs. It might be fair to compare the maturity of this Web3 
technology with the internet in the first half of the 1990s when it needed the combination of 
the WWW, HTML, ICT infrastructure, software support, affordable hardware and disruptive 
business ideas like social media and the formation of unprecedented “superorganisations” 
such as Google, Apple and Amazon to leverage the present age of information. 
Undoubtedly, underpinning cryptoeconomic Web3 concepts still require substantial 
optimisation and streamlining towards real-world viability including user convenience. 
Another challenge represents the significant power consumption required to secure first-
generation blockchains by “Proof of Work”. Newer protocols such as “Proof of Stake” or 
“Delegated Proof of Stake” [110], massively reduce the environmental footprint. 
As for many blockchain-based technologies, there is also a risk of compromising financial 
regulation, e.g., whether (U.S.) securities laws may apply to virtual organisations [41] and 
their related tokens. In response to these legal issues, models like dual token sales [40] 
have been elaborated. Volatility and taxation of crypto-assets as well as regulatory 
compliance, e.g., on DAOs, tokens and prediction markets, and their anchoring in legal 
frameworks, e.g., regarding intellectual property rights (IPR) and the status of organisations 
that cannot easily be assigned to a specific country, need to be resolved. Also the promise 
that blockchain tokens may fulfil a future “utility” within its superordinate “ecosystem” has not 
materialised thus far. 
Despite these significant challenges, there are significant developments towards 
government-sanctioned blockchain technologies in numerous countries, e.g., in Germany 
  
[111, 112]. The world of investors seems to be divided on the future prospect of “crypto” 
enabled businesses into enthusiastic supporters and fierce critics [113]. 
Grass-Roots Driven Solutions for Saving the Planet 
Even in the face of striking evidence that has amassed up over recent decades [1-3], 
governments are unable or reluctant to internationally fund, coordinate and implement urgent 
countermeasures to effectively mitigate severe consequences for mankind. The most jarring 
example is the immediate need to enact measures for shielding the global biosphere from 
detrimental and irreversible changes to its climate and biodiversity, and thus to guarantee a 
safe habitat and food supply for future generations. As opposed to other catastrophic 
scenarios like pandemics, the consequences on our vital ecosphere reach too far in the 
future and do not offer any substantial return-on-investment for private stakeholders; so 
taking effective, but possibly painful immediate actions is likely to seriously jeopardise re-
election of governments [9]. 
 
Figure 2 Truth finding mechanism at the pivot of a new type DAO for “Saving the Planet” straddling the real and 
virtual world. A blockchain platform implements formalised trust and transactions of (crypto-)assets raised 
through crowdfunding from individuals, organisations and governments. To ensure high quality and credibility of 
results, activities encompassing work packages, validation and acquisition of data is crowdsourced and 
incentivised by bounties through competitive parallelisation involving a cohort of independent players. Decision 
making of the new DAO is based on creating prediction markets where contributors offer “skin in the game” 
through formalised reputation and staking schemes. 
Therefore, this paper encourages crafting a new type of DAO so that highly complex and 
multi-facetted projects involving significant budgets can be initiated and led by even loosely 
organised and diversely structured, community-driven international initiatives. It is suggested 
that the central problems of finding “trust” and “truth” may, in principle, be addressed by 
synergistically combining a set of mechanisms that are already available – to varying extent 
and maturity - in each contributing discipline. The tamper-proof distributed ledger of rapidly 
emerging blockchain technologies and its smart contracts provide a solid backbone to 
endow trust and transparency, and to furnish safe transactions, formal reputation schemes, 
data handling and governance. 
  
Figure 2 proposes a basic principle of truth finding in a DAO for the global Commons “Saving 
the Planet”. Best quality and maximum credibility of work is achieved through pairing 
competitive parallelisation of crowdsourcing, which is incentivised by bounties. Decision 
making is backed by “Wisdom of the Crowds” or “Collective Intelligence” where a large and 
diverse group of pundits creates prediction markets and provides assessment. Credibility of 
judgement is underpinned by their “skin in the game” in terms of putting their reputation and 
assets on the line. The system is fuelled by crowdfunded (crypto-)assets that is managed on 
the tamper-free distributed ledger of a blockchain. 
Conclusions & Outlook 
The global community needs to find mechanisms that can take effective actions to Save the 
Planet. This paper proposes to devise, advance and converge a set of foundational 
technologies that are coordinated through a repertoire of DLTs to leverage large-scale and 
long-term Commons. These initiatives are driven and operated by pancontinental, shared-
interest groups, rather than entirely relying on predominantly nationally focussed politics. 
This unified approach to the design of a DAO with ‘operating principles and protocols’ for 
coordinating stakeholders across physical and digital environments may be particularly 
effective, given the increasing complexity (greater dispersion of communities geographically) 
and interdependency (increasing dispersion of activities across ‘national’ boundaries) in 
taking action. Flanked by proper marketing, the successful creation of an efficient and 
transparent Commons project is likely to provide a prime vehicle for global crowdfunding 
from individuals, charities, corporations, governments and transnational organisations. 
Similar solutions may apply to other Commons where issues of trust, transparency and truth 
finding are satisfactorily addressed by wisdom of the crowds / crowdsourcing / crowdfunding. 
Areas of bottom-up organised measures might, for instance, be relevant in the context of 
prevention, preparation and management of arising issues in health (e.g., pandemics [114], 
life-style related diseases [115, 116]), financial crises [12, 117], education [118], fair trade 
[119], food and animal welfare [120], natural (e.g., earth quakes [121], tsunamis [122], 
asteroids [123]) and man-made (e.g., nuclear power [124-126], wildfires [127], monoculture 
[128], microplastics in food chain [129]) disasters where the question is mostly “when”, rather 
than “if”. 
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